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ABSTRACT
Face spoofing causes severe security threats in face recognition systems. Previous anti-spoofing works
focused on supervised techniques, typically with either binary or auxiliary supervision. Most of them
suffer from limited robustness and generalization, especially in the cross-dataset setting. In this paper,
we propose a semi-supervised adversarial learning framework for spoof face detection, which largely
relaxes the supervision condition. To capture the underlying structure of live faces data in latent
representation space, we propose to train the live face data only, with a convolutional Encoder-De-
coder network acting as a Generator. Meanwhile, we add a second convolutional network serving
as a Discriminator. The generator and discriminator are trained by competing with each other while
collaborating to understand the underlying concept in the normal class(live faces). Since the spoof
face detection is video based (i.e., temporal information), we intuitively take the optical flow maps
converted from consecutive video frames as input. Our approach is free of the spoof faces, thus being
robust and general to different types of spoof, even unknown spoof. Extensive experiments on intra-
and cross-dataset tests show that our semi-supervised method achieves better or comparable results to
state-of-the-art supervised techniques.
c© 2020
1. Introduction
Biometrics plays a key part in authentication and security
applications. Access control using face, fingerprint or iris has
been existed for quite a while in our daily life. Face recogni-
tion, one of the prevalent biometric applications, has achieved
noticeable successes (Galbally et al., 2014). Face data has been
a promising data type, due to its convenience, universality and
acceptability for users. However, traditional face recognition
systems can be easily fooled with common attacks like printed
facial photographs. To obtain access to systems, criminals are
already using some techniques to accurately simulate the bio-
metric characteristics of valid users, such as faces. This process
is known as face spoofing attack, which poses a great threat to
face recognition systems (Patel et al., 2016b; Ratha et al., 2001).
Presentation attacks (abbreviated as PA), including printed pa-
per face, replaying a video and wearing a mask, are one of
the most prevalent face spoofs. It has been demonstrated that
traditional face recognition systems could be vulnerable to PA
∗∗Corresponding author
e-mail: xuequan.lu@deakin.edu.au (Xuequan Lu)
(Chetty and Wagner, 2006; Frischholz and Dieckmann, 2000;
Frischholz and Werner, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to de-
sign robust countermeasure techniques to deal with the weak-
ness in traditional face recognition application and prevent such
frauds. As a result, various face anti-spoofing techniques have
been proposed to detect spoof and live faces, before the face
recognition stage. The main challenge of face anti-spoofing is
how to achieve robustness and generalization to different kinds
of PA.
Many previous strategies have been proposed to deal with
the spoof face detection task. Spatial image information plays
a critical role in face recognition system. Each facial region
in our face includes different visual patterns and rich and dis-
criminative information. These information could help to dis-
tinguish some faces from others. Therefore, some strategies are
proposed to find different spoofing cues from different facial
regions by using handcrafted features, such as LBP (de Fre-
itas Pereira et al., 2012) and HOG (Yang et al., 2013). It is
hard to obtain robust texture features, due to the cost of hand-
crafted features and a lack of an explicit correlation between
pixel intensities and different types of attacks. With the recent
development of deep learning, face spoofing detection based
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2on high-level learning features achieve more promising perfor-
mance. However, these CNN-based methods (Li et al., 2016;
Patel et al., 2016a) are adopted in spoof face detection with a
softmax loss based on binary supervision. These supervised
methods have the risk of overfitting on the training data and
obtain low performance in the cross-dataset setting. In addi-
tion, temporal information is also a critical part in spoof face
detection. For example, a liveness detection method (Bao et al.,
2009) is proposed for spoofing face detection with using optical
flow. It attempts to find the differences in motion patterns. That
model attempts to learn the concept of optical flow generated by
3D objects and 2D planes. The motion of an optical flow field
consists of four basic movements: translation, rotation, moving,
and swing. Previous motion based methods (Jee et al., 2006;
Sun et al., 2007; Kollreider et al., 2005) usually need to learn or
obtain some explicit features using complicated modules such
as modeling the motion. Based on these features which focus
on representing specific characteristics, the trained model can
make the real face images and spoof face images more sepa-
rable. However, because of the specificity, these methods are
hard to be generalized to other spoofing types.
Previous face anti-spoofing works focused on supervised
methods, with the utilization of hand-crafted or learned fea-
tures. Most approaches typically depend on binary or auxiliary
supervision. Nevertheless, many previous works suffer from
the following major limitations partially or wholly: (1) fully
supervised setting–the utilization of both live and spoof face
data (with labels), (2) the assumption of binary classification,
and (3) the impracticality to take all types of spoof (maybe un-
known spoof) into account. Furthermore, collecting spoof face
data for training purpose is costly and time-consuming. Also,
binary supervision could be insufficient to learn a good model
and make desired predictions in cross dataset scenario. As a
result, those face anti-spoofing techniques have limited robust-
ness and generalization to various types of spoofing.
Motivated by the above limitations and analysis, we pro-
pose a novel adversarial network for anti-spoofing under the
semi-supervised setting. We propose to train the live face data
only, with a convolutional Encoder-Decoder network acting as a
Generator. Besides, a second convolutional network is regarded
as a Discriminator. The generator attempts to reconstruct the
original input sample to fool the discriminator, while the dis-
criminator tries to distinguish original images from generated
images. In the process of training, both sub-networks compete
with each other to achieve high-quality reconstructions for live
faces data only.
While testing, the learned model has a lower reconstruction
error of live face data than spoof face data. This is mainly be-
cause we train on live face data only, the model captures the
real characteristic of live faces samples and the learned model
can better describe the characteristics of live faces than those
of spoof faces. We naturally take the optical flow maps con-
verted from consecutive video frames as input, as the task of
spoof face detection is video-based and involves temporal infor-
mation. The semi-supervised setting significantly reduces the
efforts in collecting spoof face data, thus making our method
more robust and general to different types of face spoofing. As
such, the proposed approach is practical in the real world. We
validate our method on challenging datasets. We also com-
pare our semi-supervised method with state-of-the-art super-
vised anti-spoofing techniques, showing that our method pro-
duces better or comparable results to those approaches.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• a novel semi-supervised approach training on live face
data only for spoof face detection.
• we propose a framework trained by generator and discrim-
inator adversarially while collaborating to understand the
real underlying concept in the normal class and classifying
the testing samples by pixel-wise reconstruction error.
• we design a domain adaption algorithm which tries to
learn some transfer components across domains in a Re-
producing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) using Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (MMD).
• validation on challenging datasets, and extensive compar-
isons (intra- and cross-dataset testing) with current super-
vised anti-spoofing techniques.
The rest the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the relevant research. We elaborate our approach in Section
3. Section 4 gives various experimental results, and Section 5
concludes our work.
2. Related Work
The previous face anti-spoofing methods (Boulkenafet et al.,
2017; de Freitas Pereira et al., 2012, 2013; Komulainen et al.,
2013a; Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al., 2011; Mirjalili and Ross, 2017; Patel
et al., 2016b; Yang et al., 2013) can be generally divided into
four categories: feature based methods, temporal information
based methods, Hybrid methods as well as approaches based
on other cues. Tab. 1 compares the characteristics of these pre-
vious spoof detection methods, including LBP (Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al.,
2011), DoG-SL (Peixoto et al., 2011), Color-texture (Boulke-
nafet et al., 2015), Optical flow field (Bao et al., 2009), Live-
ness optical flow (Smiatacz, 2012), Structure-tensor(Kollreider
et al., 2005), Spatial-temporal domain (Sun et al., 2018), Patch-
based CNN (Atoum et al., 2017), VGG (Li et al., 2016), Aux-
iliary (Liu et al., 2018) and De-Spoof (Jourabloo et al., 2018).
2.1. Feature-based Methods
Most early face anti-spoofing works used handcrafted fea-
tures of texture information for binary classification (e.g.,
SVM). They expected that differing feature descriptors such as
LBP (de Freitas Pereira et al., 2012, 2013; Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al., 2011),
HOG (Komulainen et al., 2013a; Yang et al., 2013), DoG-SL
(Komulainen et al., 2013a; Yang et al., 2013), SIFT (Patel et al.,
2016b) and SURF (Chingovska et al., 2012) could be computed
for live and spoof faces. Nonetheless, many feature descriptors
are largely affected by illumination, imagery and other factors.
Such feature-based methods often have poor generalization in
cross-dataset testing (Liu et al., 2018).
3Table 1. Characteristics of different face spoof detection methods.
Methods Analysis type Strategy Datasets Algorithm type
LBP Texture analysis Micro-texture analysis via LBP with SVM as
a classifier
NUAA Photograph Imposter
Database
Supervised
DoG-SL Texture analysis Applying an adaptive histogram equalisation
to the images
Yale Face Database and NUAA
Photograph Imposter Database
Supervised
Color-texture Texture analysis Computing a half of Face with another half
that is divided in two ways: horizontally and
vertically
CASIA Face Anti-Spofing and the
Replay-Attack databases
Supervised
Optical flow field Motion analysis Analyzing the optical flow field to detect real
face
- Supervised
Structure tensor Motion analysis Face motion estimation based on the struc-
ture tensor and a few frames
XM2VTS database Supervised
Spatial-temporal
Domain
Motion analysis + Texture
analysis
A two-stream structure (spatial, temporal ) Replay-Attack, CASIA and
3DMAD
Supervised
Patch-based
CNN
Texture analysis +cue
analysis
Extracting the local features and holistic
depth maps from the face images
CASIA-FASD, MSU-USSA, and
Replay-Attack
Supervised
VGG Texture analysis Extracting the deep partial features from the
convolutional neural network (CNN)
Replay-Attack and CASIA Supervised
Liveness optical
flow
Motion analysis Applying the Support Vector Machine to dis-
tinguish between the motion information of
real faces and photographs
Regensburg university dataset Supervised
Auxiliary Texture analysis + cues
analysis
Fusing the estimated depth and rPPG to dis-
tinguish live v.s. spoof faces
CASIA-MFSD and Replay-Attack Supervised
De-Spoof Texture analysis A CNN architecture with proper constraints
and supervisions
Oulu-NPU, CASIA-MFSD and
Replay-Attack
Supervised
Our method Motion analysis A semi-supervised adversarial learning
framework
Nuaa, CASIA-MFSD and Replay-
Attack
Semi-Supervised
CNN is good at extracting and learning deep features. (Yang
et al., 2014) treated CNN as a classifier for face anti-spoofing,
and used different spatial scales of live and spoof face images
for training. Xu et al. (2015) proposed a LSTM-CNN archi-
tecture to predict the frames of videos. Most previous CNN
techniques for face anti-spoofing utilized a binary classification
to predict live or spoof faces (Feng et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016;
Patel et al., 2016a; Yang et al., 2014). However, both live and
spoof face data have to be considered in the training procedure.
In worse cases, the test face data does not involve cues like
printed page edges or digital replay devices while the trained
model might use such cues to detect spoof faces. As a result, the
classification ability for live and spoof faces is limited. Also, it
is difficult to explain the final results.
2.2. Methods Based on Temporal Information
As with other video-based tasks like activity recognition,
temporal information is also useful in face anti-spoofing. Some
researchers paid attention to the movement of key parts in a
face, for example, eye-blinking and lip movements. The tem-
poral information based methods are usually vulnerable to the
replay attack (i.e., replaying video with a digital device). Gan
et al. (2017) proposed a 3D convolutional network to classify
live and spoof faces, by supervisedly learning temporal fea-
tures with a stacked structure. Unfortunately, it relies on a large
amount of data and could perform poorly on small datasets. Xu
et al. (2015) introduced a new structure by combining LSTM
units with CNN for binarary classification. Feng et al. (2016)
presented a CNN by taking both optical flow features and shear-
let features as input. These methods took advantage of temporal
information to distinguish between live and spoof faces.
2.3. Hybrid Methods
Hybrid techniques combining features and temporal informa-
tion have also been proposed for spoof face detection. Schwartz
et al. (2011) used multiple low-level features to create one high
dimensional vector with the size of more than one million. They
further adopted the partial least squares approach on this vec-
tor to distinct between live and spoof faces. Komulainen et al.
(2013b) introduced the combination of computationally inex-
pensive linear classifiers for robust face anti-spoofing. They
used the fusion of motion information and features. Both meth-
ods depend on the multi-block local binary pattern and motion
estimation from input videos.
2.4. Methods Based on Other Cues
There have been considerable amount of works using other
cues derived from the original video frames (Komulainen et al.,
2013a; George et al., 2019). For example, rPPG signal, IR
image (Zhang et al., 2011), depth image (Wang et al., 2013)
and voice (Chetty, 2010) are some common cues. Neverthe-
less, such cues have their own limitations. Taking rPPG-based
methods as an instance, researchers often need to extract the
rPPG signals from a long video, to achieve decent predictions
(Liu et al., 2018). As a matter of fact, it is unfeasible for a face
anti-spoofing system to detect spoof faces through analyzing a
long video (e.g., 50 seconds).
2.5. Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection is a classical problem in computer vision.
When samples are deviating from the expected behavior defined
by “normal” samples of a training dataset, these samples are
classified as the abnormal class.
4Fig. 1. Our framework consists of a generator and a discriminator. The generator and discriminator are trained by competing and collaborating with each
other to understand the underlying structure in the live faces data. The architecture layers of each component are described on the right.
Fig. 2. Two live faces with optical flow data visualization in each row. The first image is one of the frames in each live face video, followed by seven optical
flow maps which are generated from its follow-up frames.
Recently, deep learning based autoencoders are used to learn
the pattern of normal behaviors and exploit the reconstruction
loss to detect anomalies. For example, Baur et al. (2018) tack-
les the problem by learning a mapping to a lower dimensional
representation, where the real distribution is modeled. The de-
coder upscales the latent feature vector to reconstruct the im-
age. In recent research, a lot of abnormal detection methods
(Zenati et al., 2018; Xia et al., 2019) based on the Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) are proposed. For instance, Xia
et al. (2019) proposed latent spatial features based on generative
adversarial networks for face anti-spoofing with an additional
feature classifier. The input of this framework extracts the ap-
pearance information from the original face image with differ-
ent sizes. In our work, instead we use the motion information
from the original face images. According to the ablation study
(Section 4.2.2), the performance of using motion information is
better than using appearance information. Moreover, each size
of the input corresponds to one GAN model, which induces
significantly higher costs. In addition, their framework only
reports a high performance in the intra-dataset setting. It dis-
regards the generalization issue by excluding the cross-dataset
setting, which is critical for spoofing detection.
3. Proposed Approach
In this section, we present how to learn the intrinsic structure
of live faces by using the proposed adversarial training frame-
work. We start by describing the details of the overview net-
work architecture, then depict each term in loss function, and
finally give the description of the testing method.
3.1. Network Architecture
Our method consists of a data preprocessing step and a GAN-
style architecture. The preprocessing step is to convert consec-
utive video frames into optical flow maps. Fig. 2,3,4 shows the
visualization of optical flow map. The GAN-style architecture,
inspired by the anomaly detection (Sabokrou et al., 2018), com-
prises of two components: the generation network and the dis-
crimination network. Fig. 1 shows the overview of our frame-
work.
Due to the outstanding performance of CNN (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012; Lawrence et al., 1997; Kalchbrenner et al., 2014),
we take a convolutional autoencoder as the Generator. The
main idea is that we only consider the live face data for train-
ing. The learned model is therefore not good at depicting the
characteristics of spoof face data, leading to high reconstruc-
tion errors. The reason why we employ Convolutional AutoEn-
coder (CAE) in the proposed framework can be concluded as
5Fig. 3. Two fixed spoofing faces with optical flow data visualization in each row. The first image is one of the frames in each spoofing face video by holding
the client biometry, followed by seven optical flow maps which are generated from the follow-up frames.
Fig. 4. Two hand spoofing faces with optical flow data visualization in each row. The first image is one of the frames in each spoofing face video from the
device held by the attacker’s hands, followed by seven optical flow maps which are generated from the follow-up frames.
follows: (1) Conventional Autoencoders (AEs) often ignore the
structure of 2D images, and interpret the input as a single latent
vector. (2) The network is constrained by the number of input
images. The redundant parameters in AEs force each feature
to be global by spanning the entire visual field. (3) The Con-
volutional AutoEncoder (CAE) can learn the optimal filters to
minimize the reconstruction error. In fact, Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks are usually referred to supervised learning algo-
rithms. CAE, instead, is trained only to learn filters to extract
features that can be used to reconstruct the input.
To prevent being fooled by the generator, the discriminator
learns the core characteristics in the original data during the
period of training. The discriminator also assists the generator
to get robust and stable parameters in the process of training.
This part of parameters would increase the reconstruction gap
between live faces and fake faces in the process of testing.
3.2. Overall Loss Function
To train our model, we define a loss function in Eq. (1) in-
cluding two components, the adversarial loss and the pixel-wise
image reconstruction loss.
L = wiLirec + waLadv, (1)
where wi and wa are the weighting parameters balancing the
impact of individual item to the overall object function.
Adversarial loss. The Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) (Creswell et al., 2018) originates from a game between
two players. One player is called the generator G(x). The gen-
erator creates samples that are intended to come from the same
distribution as the training data. The other player is called the
discriminator D(x). The discriminator would make a decision
whether the samples are generated by the generator or taken
from the training data. The generator attends to fool the dis-
criminator by reconstructing fake samples similar to the true
training data. This adversarial game between the generator and
discriminator can be formulated as:
Ladv = min
G
max
D
(
Ex∼px [log(D(x))]
+Ex∼px [log(1 − D(G(x)))]
)
.
(2)
Image reconstruction loss: While the discriminator tries
to differentiate between realistic images and generated images,
and the generator trying to fool the discriminator. However,
the generator is not optimized towards learning the real concept
from input data only by adversarial loss. Some prior works have
proposed that the distance between input images and generated
images should be considered. Isola et al. (2017) shows that the
use of L1 yields less blurry results than L2. Therefore, we use
L1 loss function to penalize the generator by minimizing the
distance between original input x and generated images G(x) as
follows.
Lirec = Ex∼px‖x −G(x)‖1 (3)
3.3. Data Preprocessing
We extract frames from each video with 30 frames per sec-
ond. FlowNet2.0 (Ilg et al., 2017) is then employed to esti-
mate the optical flow between frames, due to its effectiveness.
Optical flow is the pattern of apparent motion, which is calcu-
lated based on two adjacent images. It defines both horizontal
6and vertical displacements for each pixel, and reflects motion
about objects and scene. The pre-trained FlowNet model esti-
mates the optical flow between each pair of two adjacent frames
and outputs the optical flow files. The horizontal and vertical
components are included in optical flow files. The color-coding
scheme (Lo´pez, 2017) allows us to visualize the horizontal and
vertical displacements in one image, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
Colors can be assigned to each pixel. We utilize the color cod-
ing scheme to convert these optical flow files into images where
the displacement vector is color.
The output flow maps are also RGB images with colors indi-
cating the flow signal. The patches are generated from each
flow map by a sliding window. The size of this window is
set to 32 × 32. Fig. 2, 3 and 4 visualize optical flows of live
faces, spoofing faces by holding the client biometry (i.e., fixed
spoofing) and spoofing faces from the device held by the at-
tacker’s hands (i.e., hand spoofing), respectively. It shows that
the optical flows of live faces are more clear than the spoof
faces. Hand spoofing leads to considerable amount of noise on
the flow maps. This is because that the movement of spoofing
faces and digital device screens is consistent. For fixed spoofing
faces, printed faces are fixed in front of the detection systems.
This type involves few noise and nearly no optical flows.
3.4. Testing method
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework,
we conduct two intra-testing experiments and one cross-testing
experiment. For intra-testing experiments, the model is trained
in the training dataset accordingly, as with the state-of-the-art
methods (Yu and Jia, 2017). The testing dataset in the same
domain is used to evaluate the performance of each method.
Different from intra-testing experiments, cross-database exper-
iments with different domains are more challenging. Domain
adaptation (Finkel and Manning, 2009) is a field associated with
machine learning and transfer learning. The aim of the domain
adaptation problem is to train a well performing model from the
source data distribution. The trained model could still perform
well on a different (but related) target data distribution. As such,
we attempt to extend the domain adaptation in our study. To our
knowledge, we are the first to investigate the domain adaptation
issue in the face anti-spoofing area.
In the cross-database situation, the labels of all target samples
are unknown during training. Compared with the intra-database
Fig. 5. Visualization of horizontal and vertical displacements in one RGB
image.
setting, it is more ubiquitous in real-world applications. Due to
the unavailability of labels in the target domain, one commonly
used strategy is to learn domain-invariant representations via
minimizing the domain distribution discrepancy. In our cross-
database scenario, the model is trained on dataset A and tested
on dataset B. There exists some difference between the source
domain and target domain, for example, image quality, reflec-
tion and environment. One intuitive solution is to consider map-
ping the reconstruction data to a high (possibly infinite) dimen-
sional space and computing the sample means in this space us-
ing high-order statistics (up to infinity). As a result, we could
achieve a better discrimination threshold for live and spoofing
faces. By contrast, directly training a classifier on the source
data and using the threshold set in the source data often leads
to certain “overfitting” to the source distribution and reduced
performance while testing on the target domain.
We consider a source domain Ds = {xsi , ysi }i=1,...,ns and a tar-
get domainDt = {xti, yti}i=1,...,nt . Here, xsi ∈ RNs , xti ∈ RNt are the
reconstruction errors for each frame in the source domain and
the target domain, respectively. ysi ∈ C, yti ∈ C are correspond-
ing labels, where the target labels
{
yti
}
i=1,...,nt
are not available
for training. For domain adaption, we assume that the source
and target domains are associated with the same label space,
while Ds and Dt are drawn from distributions Ps and Pt which
are assumed to be different. That is, the source and target dis-
tribution have different joint distributions of data X and labels
Y: Ps(X,Y) , Pt(X,Y).
Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) Yan et al. (2017) is
an effective non-parametric metric for comparing the distance
between two distributions. Given two distributions s and t, by
mapping the data to a reproduced kernel Hilbert space (RKHS)
using function φ(·), the MMD between s and t is defined as,
MMD(s, t) = sup
‖φ‖H≤1
‖Exs∼s[φ(xs)] − Ext∼t[φ(xt)]‖H , (4)
where Exs∼s[·] denotes the expectation with regard to the distri-
bution s, and ‖φ‖H ≤ 1 defines a set of functions in the unit ball
of a RKHS. Based on the statistical tests defined by MMD, we
have MMD(s, t) = 0 ⇐⇒ s = t. Denote by Ds =
{
xsi
}M
i=1
and
Dt =
{
xti
}N
i=1
, two sets of samples drawn i.i.d. from the distri-
butions s and t respectively, the empirical estimation of MMD
can be given by:
MMD (Ds,Dt) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1M
M∑
i=1
φ
(
xsi
)
− 1
N
N∑
j=1
φ
(
xtj
)∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥H , (5)
where φ(·) denotes the feature map associated with the kernel
map k
(
xs, xt
)
=
〈
φ (xs) , φ
(
xt
)〉
, which is usually defined as the
convex combination of several basis kernels.
With the help of MMD, the statistical test method works in
the following way. Based on the samples of two distributions,
one distribution is the reference distribution formed by training
live face samples, and another distribution is obtained in the
same way from test samples. By finding the continuous func-
tion φ in the sample space, the mean value of the samples from
different distributions on function φ is obtained. Dividing the
7two mean values yields an average difference between the two
distributions. Finally, MMD is taken as the measurement to de-
termine the category of the test videos. If the value of MMD
is smaller than the predefined threshold T, the test samples dis-
tribution is considered to be the close to the live face reference
distribution; otherwise they are spoof videos. The final testing
scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Spoofing Detection in video V
input: A video V = [F1, F2, ...FN ], trained models: Generator, Auxiliary en-
coder and decision threshold T
output: report if (ScoreVideo > T) ’spoof’ else ’non-spoof’
1: function Distribution(V)
2: FrameArray=[]
3: for k ← 1 to N do
4: ScoreFrame=
∥∥∥Ge(Fk) −Ge′ (F′k)∥∥∥1
5: FrameArray← FrameArray +ScoreFrame
6: end for
7: return FrameArray
8: end function
9: ReferDis= Distribution(TrainPosVideo)
10: TestDis= Distribution(TestVideo)
11: ScoreVideo = MMD(ReferDis,TestDis)
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we firstly present the experimental setting,
including datasets, and more implementation details. Then,
for ablation study, two experiments are conducted to analyze
the proposed method in detail. Finally, We evaluate proposed
method and the state-of-the-art techniques on both intra/inter-
dataset settings.
4.1. Experimental Setup and Datasets
The proposed method is mainly implemented in the Ten-
sorflow framework (Abadi et al., 2015). The experiments are
carried out on a PC with a NVIDIA-1080 graphics card and
a multi-core 2.1 GHz CPU. A good face anti-spoofing sys-
tem must be robust to different types of attacks. We evaluate
our method and the state-of-the-art techniques on three pub-
licly available face spoofing detection databases: (i) NUAA Im-
poster Database (Tan et al., 2010a), (ii) Replay-Attack (Chin-
govska et al., 2012) dataset, and (iii) CASIA MFSD (Zhang
et al., 2012) dataset. These structures are kept fixed for all
databases, and learning rate is set to 0.02.
Fig. 6. Some samples from the NUAA dataset. The first row and second
row show five live samples and five spoofing samples, respectively.
According to the work (Akcay et al., 2018), CIFAR10 and
MNIST datasets are used to construct the experiment to illus-
trate the superiority of our approach over the state-of-the-art
one-class classifiers. One of the classes is regarded as normal
class, while the rest ones belong to the abnormal class. In par-
ticular, we respectively get ten sets for MNIST and CIFAR10,
and then detect the outlier anomalies by only training the model
on the normal class data in ablation study.
The NUAA dataset is widely used for the evaluation of face
liveness detection. This dataset consists of 15 different subjects
captured in different places and illumination conditions, involv-
ing 12, 614 real and photographed face images. Each subject
was asked to look at the webcam frontally with a neutral ex-
pression and without noticeable movements such as eyeblink or
head movement. For training data, it contains 1, 743 real faces
and 1, 748 photographed faces. For testing, it includes 3, 362
real faces and 5, 761 photographed faces. Fig. 6 shows some
samples from the NUAA dataset.
Fig. 7. Some samples from the Replay-Attack dataset. It includes some
live faces, some spoofing faces by holding the client biometry (i.e., fixed
spoofing) and spoofing faces from the device held by the attacker’s hands
(i.e., hand spoofing).
The Replay-Attack dataset is also a widely used and publicly
available database. It has 360 videos (60 real faces videos and
300 spoof faces) as the training data. About validation data, it
has the same number of videos as training videos. The valida-
tion data will be fully used, to calibrate the threshold to distin-
guish between real and spoof faces (explained in Section 3.4).
The resolution of the Replay-Attack data is 320 × 240. The
dataset considers different lighting conditions used in spoofing
attacks. It consists of 80 videos of real faces and 400 videos of
fake faces as the testing data. The fake faces are obtained by
using the attackers’ bare hands or fixed support. Fig. 7 shows
some samples from the Replay-Attack dataset.
The CASIA (Zhang et al., 2012) dataset involves 50 sub-
jects, and each subject has 12 videos (3 real faces and 9 fake
faces). The dataset is divided into the training set (20 subjects,
240 videos) and the test set (30 subjects, 360 videos). Com-
pared with the Replay-Attack dataset, there is no validation data
in this dataset. The CASIA dataset is more difficult in spoof
face detection, in terms of image quality, resolution and video
length. It consists of print and replay attacks using correspond-
ing photos and replayed videos. Some of the print attack pho-
tos are manually cropped around the eyes to deter eye-blinking
based techniques.
There exist a lot of face anti-spoofing approaches, and many
CNN-based supervised works have achieved promising results
in the intra-database setting. However, the high intra-database
prediction accuracy does not guarantee a decent performance in
the inter-database setting which is more common in real world.
In fact, the cross-database performance better reflects the actual
8Table 2. Abnormal detection results for MNIST/CIFAR10 datasets using Protocol 2. (Plane and Car classes are annotated as Airplane and Automobile in
CIFAR10).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MEAN
OCSVM (’01) 0.988 0.999 0.902 0.950 0.955 0.968 0.978 0.965 0.853 0.955 0.9513
KDE (’06) 0.885 0.996 0.710 0.693 0.844 0.776 0.861 0.884 0.669 0.825 0.8143
DAE (’06) 0.894 0.999 0.792 0.851 0.888 0.819 0.944 0.922 0.740 0.917 0.8766
VAE (’13) 0.997 0.999 0.936 0.959 0.973 0.964 0.993 0.976 0.923 0.976 0.9696
Pix CNN (’16) 0.531 0.995 0.476 0.517 0.739 0.542 0.592 0.789 0.340 0.662 0.6183
AND (’19) 0.984 0.995 0.947 0.952 0.960 0.971 0.991 0.970 0.922 0.979 0.9671
DSVDD (’18) 0.980 0.997 0.917 0.919 0.949 0.885 0.983 0.946 0.939 0.965 0.9480
Autoencoder 0.992 1.0 0.876 0.937 0.949 0.968 0.984 0.959 0.843 0.959 0.9467
Proposed method 0.996 0.999 0.987 0.986 0.977 0.991 0.998 0.987 0.986 0.987 0.9898
PLANE CAR BIRD CAT DEER DOG FROG HORSE SHIP TRUCK MEAN
OCSVM (’01) 0.630 0.440 0.649 0.487 0.735 0.500 0.725 0.533 0.649 0.508 0.5856
KDE (’06) 0.658 0.520 0.657 0.497 0.727 0.496 0.758 0.564 0.680 0.540 0.6097
DAE (’06) 0.411 0.478 0.616 0.562 0.728 0.513 0.688 0.497 0.487 0.378 0.5358
VAE (’13) 0.700 0.386 0.679 0.535 0.748 0.523 0.687 0.493 0.696 0.386 0.5833
Pix CNN (’16) 0.788 0.428 0.617 0.574 0.511 0.571 0.422 0.454 0.715 0.426 0.5506
AND (’19) 0.717 0.494 0.662 0.527 0.736 0.504 0.726 0.560 0.680 0.566 0.6172
DSVDD (’18) 0.617 0.659 0.508 0.591 0.609 0.657 0.677 0.673 0.759 0.731 0.6481
Autoencoder 0.735 0.585 0.752 0.703 0.375 0.687 0.594 0.397 0.781 0.500 0.6109
Proposed method 0.996 0.648 0.752 0.770 0.934 0.695 0.958 0.623 0.976 0.587 0.7930
capability of a system in real-world applications. Therefore,
a good cross-database performance provides strong evidence
that: i) features are generally invariant to different scenarios
(i.e., camera and illuminations), ii) a spoof classifier trained in
one scenario is generalizable to other scenarios, and iii) data
captured in one scenario can be useful for developing effective
spoof detectors in other scenarios. As such, to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed framework, we conduct two intra-
database experiments and two cross-database experiments.
4.2. Ablation study
4.2.1. With/without the discriminator
To show the effectiveness of adversarial learning, it is neces-
sary to conduct the experiment with or without the discrimina-
tor part. In the first scenario, we only use the common convo-
lutional autoencoder with a simple image reconstruction error.
During the inference, the reconstruction error of the test sample
is regarded as the abnormality score. In the second scenario,
all components are used in the proposed framework with the
discriminator. Besides the image reconstruction error, the ad-
versarial learning loss is also considered. The generator tries
to generate a high quality image to fool the discriminator. The
discriminator attempts to distinguish the generated image from
a realistic image. During the training process, the discriminator
helps the generator to capture the underlying concept of normal
samples. The test sample is detected in the same way as the first
scenario (i.e., image reconstruction error).
Since we formulate the spoof face detection task as abnor-
mal detection task, it is necessary to explore the effectiveness
of the proposed method in both tasks. In the abnormal de-
Table 3. Classification performance of autoencoder (without discrimina-
tor) and the proposed method (with discriminator), in terms of HTER
(%). They are trained using the CASIA-MFSD dataset and tested on the
Replay-Attack dataset, and vice versa.
Methods Train Test Train Test AverageCASIA
MFSD
Replay
Attack
Replay
Attack
CASIA
MFSD
Autoencoder 25.6% 47.3% 36.5%
Proposed method 15.6% 44.1% 29.8%
tection task, we conduct an experiment to demonstrate the su-
periority of our method over state-of-the-art one-class classi-
fiers on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, shown in Tab. 2. For
both MNIST and CIFAR10, we select one class as the normal
class at each time, while leaving the rest to be the abnormal
classes, leading to ten sets for abnormal detection. Normal data
and abnormal data are to imitate live faces and spoof faces, re-
spectively. Our method typically achieves improvements com-
pared with other methods, including OCSVM (Scho¨lkopf et al.,
2001), KDE (Bishop, 2006), DAE (Hadsell et al., 2006), VAE
(Kingma and Welling, 2013), Pix CNN (Kalchbrenner et al.,
2016), AND (Abati et al., 2019) and DSVDD (Ruff et al., 2018).
In addition, it is clear that the proposed method with the dis-
criminator achieves higher performance than the autoencoder
without the support from discriminator in both datasets. In
our spoofing face detection task, the cross-dataset experiment
is also conducted by using the two scenarios (with and without
the discriminator) described above. As shown in Tab. 3, the
discriminator helps the generator (Autoencoder) to capture the
concept of live faces. The trained generator is used to detect the
spoof faces directly, and we obtain a better performance with
the dsicriminator than the autoencoder strategy without the dis-
criminator.
4.2.2. Impact on performance with optical flow
Table 4. Classification performance of the proposed approach in different
types (motion or appearance) of input, in terms of HTER (%). The algo-
rithm is trained using the CASIA-MFSD dataset and tested on the Replay-
Attack dataset, and vice versa.
Methods Train Test Train Test AverageCASIA
MFSD
Replay
Attack
Replay
Attack
CASIA
MFSD
Appearance information 30.8% 49.7% 40.3%
Motion information 15.6% 44.1% 29.8%
To explore the influence of optical flow information, we con-
sider to use appearance information and motion information in
the experiments, respectively. In the appearance information
situation, we only use the original frame from video, which is
taken as the input of the proposed method. In the motion infor-
mation situation, only the optical information is obtained from
9Table 5. Performance comparison using AUC on the NUAA dataset
Methods Accuracy
Ours(semi-supervised) 99.3%
ADKMM (’17) 99.3%
ND-CNN (’17) 99.3%
DS-LSP (’15) 98.5%
CDD (’13) 97.7%
DoG-SL (’11) 94.5%
M-LBP (’11) 92.7%
DoG-LRBLR (’10) 87.5%
DoG-F (’04) 84.5%
DoG-M (’12) 81.8%
original videos. A performance comparison between these two
cases is presented in Tab. 4. Compared with appearance in-
formation, the motion information could better assist in distin-
guishing the spoofing faces from live faces.
4.3. Intra NUAA Database Experiment
We evaluate the performance of the proposed method and
state-of-the-art techniques on the NUAA dataset, in an intra-
database sense. The competitors include DoG and high fre-
quency based (DoG-F) (Li et al., 2004), multiple difference of
Gaussian (DoG-M) (Zhang et al., 2012), DoG-sparse logistic
(DoG-SL) (Peixoto et al., 2011), diffused speed-local speed pat-
tern (DS-LSP) (Kim et al., 2015), multiple local binary pattern
(M-LBP) (Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al., 2011), DoG-sparse low-rank bilinear
logistic regression (DoG-LRBLR) (Tan et al., 2010b), DoG-
sparse logistic (DoG-SL) (Peixoto et al., 2011), component-
dependent descriptor (CDD) (Yang et al., 2013), ADKMM (Yu
and Jia, 2017) and the nonlinear diffusion based convolution
neural network (ND-CNN) (Alotaibi and Mahmood, 2017).
To evaluate the reconstruction performance for each epoch,
we choose three face spoofing samples and three live samples
from the train set randomly. Once the network are trained in
each epoch, the trained model would output the reconstructed
images of these live or spoofing samples. Fig. 8 reveals that
the gap between the reconstruction losses of spoofing faces and
those of live faces are increased until they become stable af-
ter a few epochs. This indicates that the proposed approach
can quickly distinguish spoof faces from live samples, without
requiring spoof face data for training. Tab. 5 shows the accu-
racies for all methods. Our semi-supervised approach achieves
the best performance, which is the same as the supervised AD-
KMM (Yu and Jia, 2017) and supervised ND-CNN (Alotaibi
and Mahmood, 2017).
4.4. Intra Replay-Attack Dataset Experiment
We also compared our method with state-of-the-art tech-
niques on the Replay-Attack dataset, in the intra-database set-
ting. Competitors includes LBPu23×3 +x
2 (Chingovska et al.,
2012), LBPu23×3+LDA (Chingovska et al., 2012), LBP
u2
3×3+SVM
(Chingovska et al., 2012), LBP + SVM (Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al., 2011),
DS-LBP (Kim et al., 2015), ND-CNN (Alotaibi and Mah-
mood, 2017), VGG (Li et al., 2016), Color-texture (Boulke-
nafet et al., 2015), Fisher-vector-encoding (Boulkenafet et al.,
2016), Depth-based-CNNs (Patch-based CNN , Depth -based
CNN and Patch and depth CNN) (Atoum et al., 2017), D-K (Yu
and Jia, 2017), DTCNN (Tu et al., 2019a), Hand-crafted + CNN
(Rehman et al., 2020) and Generalized deep feature (Li et al.,
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Fig. 8. Reconstruction performance with different numbers of iterations
(epoch) on the NUAA dataset.
Table 6. Performance comparison using HTER measure on the Replay-
Attack dataset (intra-database setting).
Methods test
LBPu23×3 +x
2 (’12) 34.0%
LBPu23×3 + LDA (’12) 17.2%
LBPu23×3 + SVM (’12) 15.16%
LBP + SVM (’11) 13.9%
DS-LBP (’15) 12.5%
Color-texture (’15) 2.9%
VGG (’16) 4.3%
D-K (’16) 4.3%
Fisher-vector-encoding (’16) 2.0%
ND-CNN (’17) 10.0%
Patch-based CNN (’17) 1.2%
Depth -based CNN (’17) 0.7%
Patch and depth CNN (’17) 0.7%
Generalized deep feature (’18) 1.2%
DTCNN (’19) 20.0%
Hand-crafted + CNN (’20) 2.3%
Ours 12.3%
Ours with motion judgment 3.5%
2018a). Previous spoofing face detectors have achieved out-
standing performance in the intra-dataset setting by supervised
learning with both positive and negative labels. To certain de-
gree, these supervised methods have the risk of overfitting on
the training data and obtain poor generalization in cross-dataset
setting. In addition, in the real world, it is impossible for us
to collect and cover all kinds of spoof faces. Some types of
spoofing faces are even unknown. Based on these challenges,
we formulate the spoofing faces detection task as an abnormal
detection task by only training the normal samples (live faces),
which obtain a comparable performance in intra dataset setting
with strong generalization.
The proposed method obtains the best performance with only
40 epochs. Fig. 10 shows the reconstruction loss for live and
spoof faces. Besides the training data and testing data, this
dataset also provides the development data to evaluate the per-
formance. we calculate the half total error rate (HT ER) (Ben-
gio and Marie´thoz, 2004) to measure the performance. The
HT ER is half of the sum of the false rejection rate (FRR) and
false acceptance rate (FAR). The half total error rate (HT ER)
would be also used in the metric of cross-database experiments.
HT ER =
FRR + FAR
2
(6)
The way to perform the attacks can be divided into two sub-
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Fig. 9. Three distributions of reconstruction error scores. It consists of live
faces, spoofing faces by holding the client biometry (i.e., fixed spoofing)
and spoofing faces from the device held by the attacker’s hands (i.e., hand
spoofing).
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Fig. 10. Three kinds of reconstruction performance with different iteration
numbers (epoch) on the intra Replay-Attack database experiment.
sets: the first subset is composed of videos generated using a
stand to hold the client biometry (“fixed”). For the second sub-
set, the attackers hold the devices with their own hands. We
choose three samples from each set (fixed spoofing, hand spoof-
ing and live validation). Fig. 10 illuminates that the recon-
struction loss of live faces decreases sharply at the beginning of
training. It tends to be stable with minor changes after that, un-
til the 66-th epoch where both the reconstruction losses of live
and spoof faces start to oscillate.
It is noteworthy that the changes in live reconstruction error
and fixed spoof faces reconstruction error are consistent with
increasing iterations. From Fig. 3, there is no temporal infor-
mation in the way of using a stand to hold the client biometry
(“fixed”) except some noise in the optical flow maps. Thus,
the performance of reconstruction loss for fixed spoofing faces
would be great and even better than live faces. Fig. 9 also fur-
ther verifies what we have found in Fig. 3.
A performance comparison with previous methods is shown
in Tab. 6. On the test set of the Replay-Attack dataset, the
HT ER of our method is 0.123, and we achieve a compara-
ble HTER to other methods (worse than the best). This re-
sult attributes to two factors. Firstly, the binary classification
methods, using both positive and negative data with labels, of-
ten achieve excellent performance in the intra-database setting
(i.e., train and test within the same dataset). Some of the com-
pared methods even use depth information or other extra cues
for spoof faces detection. Secondly, as we explained before,
most fixed spoof faces are mistakenly identified as live faces
based on low reconstruction loss due to no motion cues (e.g.,
Fig. 3).
To tackle this issue, we design a new module which is respon-
sible for detecting the presence of motion information. This is
achieved through calculating the average pixel difference be-
tween pairs of optical flow maps of random frame samples. If
there is no noticeable difference between each pair of optical
flow maps, it means no motion information. With the support
of this motion detection module, we could obtain more infor-
mation for spoof faces before the real face spoofing detection.
The HT ER of our method can be declined from 0.123 to 0.035,
with the aid of such motion judgment.
4.5. Cross-database Experiments
The cross-database performance is evaluated by training the
proposed method on the CASIA-MFSD dataset and testing it
on the Replay-Attack dataset, and vice versa.
Table 7. Classification performance in terms of HTER (%). The models are
trained using the CASIA-MFSD dataset and tested on the Replay-Attack
dataset, and vice versa. 1: supervised method. 2: semi-supervised method.
Methods Train Test Train Test AverageCASIA
MFSD
Replay
Attack
Replay
Attack
CASIA
MFSD
1-LBP (’13) 47.0% 39.6% 43.3%
1-LBP-TOP (’13) 49.7% 60.6% 55.2%
1-Motion (’13) 50.2% 47.9% 49.1%
1-CNN (’14) 48.5% 45.5% 47.0%
1-Color LBP (’15) 37.9% 35.4% 36.7%
1-Color Tex (’16) 30.3% 37.7% 34.0%
1-Auxiliary(’18) 27.6% 28.4% 28.0%
1-De-Spoof(’18) 28.5% 41.1% 34.8%
1-DA (’18) 27.4% 36.0% 31.7%
1-Dynamic texture (’18) 22.2% 35.0% 28.6%
1-OF Domain (’18) 30.1% 36.8% 33.5%
1-GFA-CNN (’19) 21.4% 34.3% 28.0%
1-ADA (’19) 17.5% 41.6% 29.6%
2-Proposed method 15.6% 44.1% 29.8%
We first consider training on the training set of the CASIA-
MFSD database and testing on the testing set of the Replay-
Attack database. The quantitative results shown in Tab. 7 con-
firm that the proposed method achieves the best performance
(HT ER = 0.156) on the Replay-Attack test set which includes
different types of spoofing attacks. The competitors consist
of LBP (de Freitas Pereira et al., 2013), LBP-TOP (de Fre-
itas Pereira et al., 2013), Motion (de Freitas Pereira et al.,
2013), CNN (Yang et al., 2014), Color LBP (Boulkenafet et al.,
2015), Color Tex (Boulkenafet et al., 2016), Auxiliary (Liu
et al., 2018), De-Spoof (Jourabloo et al., 2018),DA (Li et al.,
2018b),Dynamic texture (Shao et al., 2018), OF Domain (Sun
et al., 2018), ADA (Wang et al., 2019) and GFA-CNN (Tu et al.,
2019b). In Fig. 14, it is obvious that the trained model has
strong generalization ability to make live faces and fake faces
obtained by using the attackers’ bare hands separable. How-
11
Fig. 11. First row: original optical flow images of live faces. Second row: generated optical flow images of live faces. Third row: corresponding maps which
display the differences between the original images (the first row) and generated images (the second row) from model by red points.
Fig. 12. First row: original optical flow images of spoofing faces. Second row: generated optical flow images of spoofing faces. Third row: corresponding
maps which display the differences between original image (the first row) and generated images (the second row) by red point.
ever, some fake faces obtained by fixed support has the same
distribution as live faces.
We then conduct the opposite experiment: training on the
training set of the Replay-Attack dataset and testing on the test-
ing set of the CASIA-MFSD dataset. Our method achieves a
competitive performance (HT ER = 0.441) for the cross testing
on the testing set of the CASIA-MFSD dataset. From Tab. 7,
we can see that the HT ER of our method is better than most
binary supervision methods (Yang et al., 2014; Jourabloo et al.,
2018; Wu et al., 2016; Boulkenafet et al., 2016, 2015). This
demonstrates that the proposed approach can better identify the
differences between live and fake faces.
As with all previous works (Wu et al. 2016; Jourabloo, Liu,
and Liu 2018; Boulkenafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2016), we
observe that the models trained on CASIA-MFSD enables to
generalize better than the model trained on the Replay Attack
Database. We speculate as follows (1) It is probably because the
resolution of the CASIA-MFSD data is significantly higher than
that in the Replay-Attack dataset. The model trained with high
resolution could generalize better than the model trained with
low resolution. (2) Compared with Replay-Attack, the CASIA-
MFSD contains more variations in collected database, For ex-
ample, imaging quality, the distance between camera and face,
background and attack types. Hence, the model optimized for
Replay-Attack databases faces more challenge in the new ac-
quisition con- ditions. This is one limitation of the our method
and previous works, and worthy further research. As with pre-
vious works (Wu et al., 2016; Jourabloo et al., 2018; Boulke-
nafet et al., 2016), the two above cross-database experiments
do not have the same HT ER. We speculate that it is proba-
bly because the resolution of the CASIA-MFSD data is signif-
icantly higher than that in the Replay-Attack dataset. In Fig.
11 and 12, the first row and second row show the optical flow
maps and the reconstructed optical flow maps, respectively. The
third row visualizes the differences between the corresponding
optical maps and reconstructed maps (red color). These visual-
ization results clearly demonstrate that the reconstruction errors
from live faces are lower than that of spoofing faces.
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Fig. 13. Three kinds of reconstruction performance with different iteration
numbers (epoch) on cross-database experiment with training on the train-
ing set of the CASIA-MFSD database and testing on the testing set of the
Replay-Attack database.
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Fig. 14. Three distributions of reconstruction error scores in experiment
with training on the training set of the CASIA-MFSD database and testing
on the testing set of the Replay-Attack database.
5. Conclusion
We have presented an adversarial framework for the detec-
tion of spoofing faces. Given an input face image, the trained
model can automatically determine if it is a live or spoof face.
Current face anti-spoofing techniques have to utilize both spoof
data and live data for training, which can hardly cover every
type of spoof faces. By contrast, our approach does not need
spoof data for training, and is thus semi-supervised and robust
to different types of spoof faces. Both the intra-/cross-database
experiments show that our method achieves better or compa-
rable results to state-of-the-art techniques. We believe our re-
search will arouse some new insights in this field.
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